a room-key proposal signs the hash the verifier checks, and the ping's pill shortens a raw id

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KeelrLeek committed 2026-09-03 13:52:04 -05:00
1 parent 6f7452c803
commit 8093adc89e
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@@ -311,6 +311,32 @@ pub fn validate_asset(
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// `sign_local` has to be the exact inverse of `verify_sig_in`, and that
/// includes WHAT is signed: every family here signs blake3(body), and the
/// verifier hashes before it checks. Signing the raw body produces a
/// signature that validates nowhere — the board rejected a room-key
/// proposal for exactly this on 2026-09-03, and only a second instance
/// on the live network surfaced it.
#[test]
fn sign_local_is_the_inverse_of_verify_and_the_payload_is_hashed() {
const D: &str = "soulstream.playlist/v1";
let secret = [3u8; 32];
let body = b"a proposal body";
let payload = blake3::hash(body).as_bytes().to_vec();
let sig = sign_local(D, &secret, &payload);
assert!(verify_sig_in(D, &public_of(&secret), &payload, &sig));
assert!(
!verify_sig_in(D, &public_of(&secret), body, &sig),
"the raw body must not validate — callers hash first"
);
assert!(
!verify_sig_in("soulstream.friend/v1", &public_of(&secret), &payload, &sig),
"a signature must not cross domains"
);
}
use super::*;
use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey};